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RUBBER-STAMPING v. PROBING REVIEW-THE JUDICIAL
ROLE IN ENFORCING THE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT ACT:
LANDS COUNCIL v. POWELL
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) provides a vi-
sion and a process for making environmentally sound decisions re-
garding our national forests.1 Yet, the NFMA's structure leaves it
vulnerable to environmentally unsound results.2 In NFMA cases,
the courts act as a safeguard against environmentally unsound re-
sults just as they do in decisions under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA): if the courts find that an agency has not com-
plied with a regulation by failing to conduct an adequate study, the
courts have the ability to force an agency to reexamine their studies
and do what is necessary to make them sufficient.3 The Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) provides the underlying framework for
judicial review of agency decisions. 4 Under the APA, many courts
give great deference to the actions and decisions of the United
States Forest Service (Forest Service).5
In Lands Council v. Powell (Lands Council),6 however, the Ninth
Circuit demanded rigorous adherence to the NFMA's requirement
that any proposed project must conform to the applicable land and
1. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000) (describing main goals of Act).
2. See id. (explaining requirement that United States Forest Service create
land and resource management plan (LRM plan) for each national forest). LRM
plans may be ineffective because of two circumstances. Id. The first is that even
though the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) is required to revise LRM
plans at least every fifteen years, the Forest Service is not required to perform any
retroactive actions that may be beneficial to previously approved projects. See id.
§ 1604(0(5). The second is the deference that the courts give agency actions
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
3. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Manag-
ing Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 907 (2002)
(noting courts' role in NEPA process).
4. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq. (2000) (setting forth APA).
5. See Kristen Potter, Judicial Review of Forest Service Decisions Made Pursuant to
the National Forest Management Act's Substantive Requirements: Time for a Science Court?,
20 J. NAT'L A. ADMIN. L. JUDGEs 241, 247 (stating trend of courts is to be very
deferential to Forest Service decisions, despite NFMA's intent to limit Forest Ser-
vice's discretion).
6. 379 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2004), amended by 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005).
Changes made do not affect this Note's analysis.
(209)
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resource management plan (LRM plan). 7 The Ninth Circuit re-
versed the District Court's decision to uphold the approval of the
Iron Honey Project's timber harvest (Project) because the Ninth
Circuit determined that the Forest Service violated NFMA in ap-
proving the Project.8 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Forest Ser-
vice's argument that the Forest Service's substitute standards in the
Idaho Panhandle National Forest Management Plan (Forest Plan)
were adequate because the court should defer to the Forest Ser-
vice's expertise. 9 The NFMA plays an important role in this country
because it is meant to ensure that the Forest Service only acts in the
best interest of our national forests.' 0
This Note explores the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lands Coun-
cil, particularly the propriety of the high level of scrutiny the court
used to determine whether the Forest Service's methodology met
the NFMA's requirements." Section II summarizes the factual con-
text of Lands Council.1 2 Section III presents a background of the
pertinent parts of the NFMA and the Forest Service, as well as cases
illustrating the proper judicial deference a court should give to the
Forest Service. 13 Section IV discusses the Ninth Circuit's analysis
and holding in Lands Council.'4 Section V provides a critical analy-
sis of Lands Council by examining its consistency with prior case law
and statutory construction. 15 Finally, Section VI discusses the im-
pact of Lands Council on future judicial outcomes and agency
decisions. 16
7. See id. at 751-52 (explaining that court refused to give Forest Service ex-
treme deference).
8. See id. at 751-53 (stating holding regarding NFMA violations).
9. See id. at 751-52 (rejecting Forest Service's argument that variations were
sufficient to meet LRM plan's requirements).
10. See 16 U.S.C. § 16 04(g) (2) (setting forth NFMA requirements for creating
LRM plans).
11. For a discussion of the propriety of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lands
Counci see infra notes 134-96 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the facts of Lands Council, see infra notes 17-38 and
accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the NEPA, the Forest Service, the NFMA and related
precedent, see infra notes 39-112 and accompanying text.
14. For a narrative analysis of Lands Counci4 see infra notes 113-33 and accom-
panying text.
15. For critical analysis of Lands Council, see infra notes 134-96 and accompa-
nying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact of Lands Counci see infra notes 197-210
and accompanying text.
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II. FACTS
The Project was a watershed restoration project in the Idaho
Panhandle National Forest to restore fourteen watersheds.1 7 In
1996, the Forest Service began research for the Project, with the
goal of restoring the area's natural balance.)8 In April 2000, the
Forest Service released a Draft Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for the Project, and in November 2001, after the required
comment period expired, the Forest Service issued the Final EIS.19
The Project presented several alternative ways for its implementa-
tion, and in February 2002, the supervisor of the Idaho Panhandle
National Forest chose to utilize the option entitled "Modified Alter-
native Eight."20
The Lands Council and other nonprofit groups (Nonprofit
groups) were alarmed because this option would entail logging 17.5
million board feet of lumber from 1,408 acres of forest to fund the
Project.2' The Nonprofit groups filed an administrative appeal of
this decision.2 2 The Regional Forester of Region One of the Forest
Service, Bradley Powell, denied their appeal.23 The Nonprofit
groups then filed suit in the District Court of Idaho against Powell
and the Forest Service alleging that the Project violated the NEPA
and the NFMA.24 Both parties moved for summary judgment, and
the District Court of Idaho granted the Forest Service's Motion for
Summary Judgment. 25
The Nonprofit groups subsequently appealed this decision to
the Ninth Circuit, alleging that the Forest Service failed to comply
17. See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating Pro-
ject's location and status of watersheds that Project targeted). A watershed is the
"whole gathering ground of a river system; i.e., the geographic area from which
any river or creek draws its flow." Id. at 742 n.1.
18. See id. at 742 (stating when Forest Service began scoping for Project).
Since 1960, 39,977 acres of national forest were logged which caused upsets in
aquatic, vegetative and wildlife habitats, so the Forest Service needed to restore the
natural balance. Id.
19. See id. (noting Project's progression).
20. See id. (explaining that Modified Alternative Eight Option included har-
vesting 1,408 acres to create 17.5 million board feet of commercial lumber, creat-
ing 0.2 miles of new road, building two miles of temporary road and
reconstructing twenty-nine miles of pre-existing roads).
21. See id. (explaining reasons Nonprofit groups disagreed with decision to
proceed with "Modified Alternative Eight").
22. See Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 742 (stating action taken prior to judicial
recourse).
23. See id. at 738 (identifying parties involved in suit).
24. See id. at 741 (identifying plaintiffs' allegations).
25. See id. at 743 (setting forth District Court's holding).
20051
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with requirements of the NEPA and the NFMA.26 The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the District Court's decision on five grounds, and
granted the Nonprofit group's Motion for Summary Judgment. 27
The Nonprofit groups alleged that the Forest Service violated the
NEPA because the Forest Service used inadequate methodology to
prepare the required EIS. 28 The Ninth Circuit found three NEPA
violations due to deficiencies in the Forest Service's Final EIS. 29
The Ninth Circuit also found two NFMA violations because of
non-compliance with the Forest Plan.30 The Nonprofit groups ar-
gued that meeting the Inland Native Fish Strategy (INFISH) guide-
lines did not comply with the Forest Plan because the Forest Plan
included an eighty percent success rate for fry emergence.31 The
Forest Service used the INFISH standard in place of the eighty per-
cent fry emergence standard, and asserted that this was sufficient to
comply with the Forest Plan. 32
The Forest Plan provided that the Forest Service could not ap-
prove any activity that would create detrimental soil conditions in
fifteen percent of the proposed project area.33 The Nonprofit
groups also argued that the Forest Service used an improper analy-
sis to prove that the Project would conform to this standard. 34 The
Forest Service's analysis consisted of examining samples obtained
26. See id. (explaining allegation that Forest Service violated NEPA by erring
in its methodology used and its cumulative effects analysis, thus resulting in incom-
plete EIS). The Nonprofit groups alleged that the Forest Service violated the
NFMA because the Forest Service did not comply with the Idaho Panhandle Na-
tional Forest Plan. See id. at 750.
27. See Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 754-55 (setting forth Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing). The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo. Id. Under the APA, the Ninth Circuit could only reverse an administrative
agency's decision if that decision was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise contrary to the law. See id. at 743 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)).
28. See id. at 743 (stating plaintiffs' allegations that Forest Service's EIS vio-
lated NEPA because of errors in cumulative analysis and in scientific
methodology).
29. See id. at 743-50 (listing Forest Service's alleged NEPA violations). The
Nonprofit groups alleged that the Forest Service violated the NEPA by: (1) not
taking a "hard look" at prior timber harvests in its EIS; (2) not taking a "hard look"
at the evidence regarding trout habitat; and (3) heavily relying on the water and
sediment yields model. Id.
30. See id. at 751-53 (specifying NFMA violations).
31. See id. at 750 n.19 (explaining that 80% fry emergence rate under Forest
Plan means that 80% of fish which hatch can emerge from sediment that has set-
tled on eggs).
32. See Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 751 (stating standard Forest Service used in
its analysis).
33. See id. at 752 (noting Forest Plan's standard for soil conditions).
34. See id. (stating Nonprofit groups' argument regarding second alleged
NFMA violation).
4
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol16/iss2/3
RUBBER-STAMPING V. PROBING REVIEW
throughout the forest and aerial photographs to create a spread-
sheet model, which was used to obtain estimates.35 The Forest Ser-
vice argued that this methodology was sufficient because the Forest
Service tested similar soils, and therefore the court should give its
methodology deference.3 6
The Ninth Circuit held: (1) the fry emergence standard did
not comply with the Forest Plan, because the Forest Service used
the INFISH standard in its analysis; and (2) the Forest Service used
an unreliable methodology to calculate the amount of soil that was
in a detrimental state because it used only aerial photographs and
samples from throughout the forest.37 Due to the violations, the
Ninth Circuit granted the Nonprofit group's Motion for Summary
Judgment, which prohibited the implementation of the "Modified
Alternative Eight" option of the Project until the NEPA and NFMA
were satisfied. 38
III. BACKGROUND
A. The NEPA, the NFMA and the APA
1. The NEPA
One purpose of the NEPA is to "promote efforts which will pre-
vent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man."3 9 To accomplish this
goal, the NEPA uses both substantive and procedural requirements
to ensure that agencies consider the environmental impact of their
decisions.40 The NEPA was drafted with a focus on "notions of sus-
tainability and ecosystem balance." 41 Yet, it is important to note
35. See id. at 742 (noting methodology Forest Service used to determine
amount of soil in detrimental state).
36. See id. (stating Forest Service's defense of its methodology).
37. See Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 751-53 (specifying NFMA violations). In
1995, the Forest Service incorporated the Inland Native Fish Strategy (INFISH)
into the Forest Plan to promote the health of fisheries. See id. at 751. Adopting
the INFISH guidelines into any LRM plan includes accepting that they replace any
conflicting provisions of the LRM plan, except where the initial LRM plan provides
more protection than the INFISH guidelines. See id.
38. See id. at 755 (stating holding and effect of this holding on Forest Service's
decision to proceed with Modified Alternative Eight).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000) (stating NEPA's purposes).
40. See Matthew J. Lindstrom, Ph.D., Procedures Without Purpose: The Withering
Away of the National Environmental Policy Act's Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 245, 245-46 (2000) (describing NEPA's effects); see also 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-45 (2000) (setting forth NEPA's requirements and other provisions).
41. See Lindstrom, supra note 40, at 246 (stating results stemming from
NEPA's enactment, implementation and enforcement).
2005]
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that the NEPA contains no specific monitoring procedures. 42 Also
the NEPA does not generally require "ongoing monitoring, reevalu-
ation, or project assessments." 43
2. The NFMA
The NFMA was enacted in 1976 and contains both procedural
and substantive requirements. 44 Procedurally, the NFMA requires
the Forest Service to create, implement, and regularly revise LRM
plans for each of the country's national forests. 45 Substantively, the
NFMA contains provisions to guide the Forest Service in creating its
procedural requirements, such as the requirements to maintain
plant and animal diversity; to monitor and evaluate the effects of
management practices; to allow increased harvest under certain
conditions; to determine lands suitable for harvest; and to put lim-
its on even-age management. 46
In creating the NFMA, Congress recognized that legislators
lacked the requisite scientific knowledge to implement the NFMA,
so Congress directed the Secretary of Agriculture to appoint an ob-
jective scientific advisory committee to do this.47 This committee
gave the Forest Service discretion to make specific management de-
cisions because the committee was confident that the Forest Service
would utilize contemporary scientific knowledge. 48
3. The APA
The APA provides procedural guidelines for individuals and
courts in actions against administrative agencies. 49 Under the APA,
the applicable standard of judicial review for most NEPA and
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (demonstrating absence of monitoring require-
ment).
43. See Karkkainen, supra note 3, at 927 (noting what NEPA does not require
and noting lack of recourse for mistaken EISs).
44. See Potter, supra note 5, at 245 (commenting and describing contents and
history of NFMA); see also Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 373 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citing Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 800-02 (5th Cir. 1994)) (noting NFMA has
substantive requirements that Forest Service must fulfill).
45. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (c) (stating NFMA's procedural requirement to
create and implement LRM plans for national forests).
46. See id. § 1604(g) (3) (describing regulations that Forest Service must cre-
ate pursuant to NFMA); see also Potter, supra note 5, at 246 (discussing NFMA's
substantive provisions).
47. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h) (stating Congress' directive that Secretary of Agri-
culture appoint committee of independent scientists).
48. See Potter, supra note 5, at 246 (stating committee's decision to entrust
Forest Service with discretion regarding site specific management decisions).
49. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2000) (setting forth portions of APA con-
cerning administrative procedures and judicial review).
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NFMA claims is the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard.50 This standard requires a court to uphold an agency's deci-
sion unless the agency's decision is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."51
Under this standard, courts give agencies substantial deference
when implementing a statute because they recognize that agencies
are the most capable to respond to changing circumstances within
their expertise. 52 When analyzing an agency's statutory interpreta-
tion, a court must determine whether an agency, such as the Forest
Service, "considered all 'the relevant factors and whether or not
there was a clear error of judgment.' 53 This analysis is a fact spe-
cific inquiry based on the facts in each specific case. 54
4. Cases Interpreting the APA: Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National
Resource Defense Council, Inc.5 5
In Chevron, the Supreme Court set forth a two-step analysis to
determine the proper amount of deference a court should give to
an agency's statutory interpretation. 56 The Court reviewed the En-
vironmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977.57 In 1979, EPA adopted a plant-wide
definition of the term "source."58 The National Resource Defense
50. See id. § 706(2) (a) (setting forth standard of judicial review for agency
decisions).
51. See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)) (explaining how courts apply standard of review to agency
decisions).
52. SeeJeffery E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response
to Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 292 (2001) (noting primary
reason underlying judicial deference to decisions of administrative agencies).
53. See Eric Madden, Seeing the Science for the Trees: Employing Daubert Standards
to Assess the Adequacy of National Forest Management Under the National Forest Manage-
ment Act, 18J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 321, 336 (2003) (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)) (discussing application of arbitrary
and capricious standard).
54. See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 368 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 415) (discussing application of arbitrary
and capricious standard).
55. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
56. See id. at 842-44 (setting forth method of review).
57. See id. at 838 (presenting issue Court was to decide in case as whether
EPA's decision to permit states to treat all pollution-emitting devices within same
industrial grouping as if they were within one "bubble" was based on reasonable
statutory construction of statutory term 'stationary source'). The statute required
states that did not meet EPA's national air quality standards to establish permit
programs for "new or modified stationary sources" of air pollution. See id. at 840.
EPA also created certain permit requirements. See id.
58. See id. at 855 (noting potential effects of EPA's interpretation). EPA's in-
terpretation would allow a plant to increase the pollution from one device as long
2005] 215
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Council (NRDC) challenged EPA's interpretation. 59 The Court ex-
amined EPA's interpretation using a two-step analysis. 60 First, the
Court must determine whether Congress has addressed the particu-
lar issue in the statute. 61 If the statute is silent or ambiguous on the
specific issue, then the court must determine whether the agency's
interpretation was reasonable.62
The Court found that neither the statutory language nor the
legislative history determined if the term "source" had a plant-wide
definition. 63 The Court then determined that EPA's interpretation
was reasonable, and thus ultimately deferred to EPA's inter-
pretation.64
B. The Forest Service
The Forest Service manages the national forests, the national
grasslands and the land utilization units.65 The Forest Service's ob-
jective is to balance protecting and conserving the nation's forests
with providing renewable and nonrenewable natural resources to
meet the country's needs. 66
When conducting its duties, the Forest Service must comply
with the NFMA's mandate to create a LRM plan that complies with
as the total amount of pollution that the plant produced did not increase. Id.
Prior to this, EPA defined "source" as any pollution-emitting device in a plant. See
id. at 853.
59. See id. at 840 (stating issue in case).
60. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859-66 (setting forth Court's analysis).
61. See id. at 859-62 (stating step one of Chevron analysis). The Court deter-
mined that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history specifically
defined the term "source." See id. at 866.
62. See id. (explaining step two of Court's analysis and holding).
63. See id. (stating step one of Court's analysis of facts).
64. See id. (stating step two of Court's analysis of facts and holding of case).
65. See 5 WEST's FED. ADMIN. PRAC. § 5238 (3d ed. 2004) (describing creation
of Forest Service).
66. See id. (explaining Forest Service's five objectives). The Forest Service's
objectives are to:
(1) provide a sustained flow of renewable resources in a combination to
best meet society's current and future needs;
(2) administer nonrenewable resources within the national forest system
to help meet the nation's energy and mineral needs;
(3) promote a healthy and productive environment for the nation's for-
ests and range lands;
(4) develop and provide scientific and technological capabilities to ad-
vance renewable natural resource management, use, and protection;
(5) conserve natural resource through cooperating with other federal
agencies, and state and local governments.
See id.
8
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the NEPA for each forest that it manages. 67 Once the Regional For-
ester approves a LRM plan for a particular national forest, all pro-
posed site-specific projects must conform to the LRM plan's
standards.
68
1. LRM Plan for the Idaho Panhandle National Forest (Forest
Plan)
The Forest Plan sets forth standards regarding fisheries and
disturbed soil conditions. 69 To protect fisheries, the Forest Plan re-
quires that there must be an eighty percent fry emergence success
rate.70 Another strategy to promote the health of fisheries is IN-
FISH, which the Forest Service incorporated into the Forest Plan. 71
Therefore, the INFISH guidelines replace the Forest Plan guide-
lines in the event of a conflict, except where the Forest Plan pro-
vided more protection than the INFISH guidelines. 72
Lands Council v. Vaught73 demonstrated how difficult it can be
to determine when the INFISH guidelines replace existing guide-
lines. In Vaught, the plaintiffs alleged that the Forest Service vio-
lated the NFMA because the Forest Service failed to show that the
project met the applicable LRM plan's standards for protecting fish-
67. See Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir.
2002) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604) (stating Forest Service's obligations); see also Inland
Empire Pub. Lands Council v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 757 (9th Cir.
1996) (describing two-stage approach to creating LRM plans for each national for-
est); see also Madden, supra note 53, at 329 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (1)) (stating
public participation as one reason for requirement that LRM plans conform to
NEPA).
68. See Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. United States Forest Serv., 137 F.3d
1372, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating requirement that site-specific activities be
consistent with that national forest's LRM); see also Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 757
(explaining that LRM plans are implemented through site-specific project compli-
ance with whole forest's LRM plans).
69. See U.S. Forest Serv., Idaho Panhandle National Forest Management Plans,
Forest-Wide Management, Standards, 11-32 - 11-33 (Aug. 1987), http://www.fs.fed.us/ip
nf/eco/manage/forestplan/fpfwmgmtdir.pdf (listing required standards regard-
ing disturbed soil analysis and fisheries).
70. See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 750 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating For-
est Plan standard that Forest Service must meet to protect fisheries). An eighty
percent fry emergence success rate means that eighty percent of hatched fish fry
can emerge from the sediment that has settled on top of the eggs before they
hatch. See id. at 750, n.19.
71. See id. at 751 (noting Forest Service adopted INFISH into Forest Plan in
1995). The Ninth Circuit explained that the INFISH guidelines serve to lessen
sediment delivery to streams because they limit timber harvest and minimize road
construction. Id.
72. See id. at 750-51 (noting normal effect of adopting INFISH in Forest Plan)
(citing Inland Native Fish Strategy, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,758 (Aug 23, 1995)) (stating
INFISH guidelines).
73. 198 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (E.D. Wash. 2002).
2005] 217
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eries.7 4 The Forest Service asserted that the INFISH guidelines
superceded the LRM plan's standards, and that the evidence
proved that the Forest Service complied with the INFISH guide-
lines. 75 The District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
held that the Forest Service did not violate the NFMA; the District
Court concluded that the INFISH guidelines and the LRM plan
were in conflict because they measured the same thing, and both
could not be met at the same time. 76 Furthermore, the District
Court concluded that the LRM plan standards did not provide
more protection for fisheries than the INFISH guidelines. 77 There-
fore, the District Court determined that the Forest Service could
fulfill the LRM plan's requirements through compliance with the
INFISH guidelines.
C. Recent Trends in Interpreting Agency Decisions
1. Emphasis on Procedure
The Supreme Court's recent trend in cases involving adminis-
trative agencies is to determine the adequacy of the agency's deci-
sion by examining whether the agency has complied with all
relevant procedural requirements. 7
a. Sierra Club v. Marita79
The Seventh Circuit illustrated this trend in Sierra Club.80
Plaintiffs presented extensive evidence to support their argument
that the Forest Service's methodology did not comply with the LRM
74. See id. at 1244 (describing plaintiffs' allegations regarding fishery protec-
tion).
75. See id. at 1244-45 (explaining Forest Service's argument).
76. See id. (stating court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Forest Ser-
vice). The District Court for the Eastern District of Washington noted that the
LRM plan standard for protecting fisheries identified delivery of sediment to
streams as a threat to fisheries. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the proposed activi-
ties delivered sediments to streams. Id. The LRM plan also required the mainte-
nance of water quality parameters and use. Id. The Forest Service argued that the
INFISH guidelines would maintain existing water quality because the proposed
project was not expected to adversely affect the watershed scale or the local tribu-
tary scale. Id.
77. See id. at 1245 (explaining INFISH standard afforded same required pro-
tection).
78. See Lindstrom, supra note 40, at 259-62 (listing Supreme Court cases
where judicial review was limited to compliance with procedural, rather than sub-
stantive, requirements of NEPA).
79. 46 F.3d 606, 621-24 (7th Cir. 1995).
80. See id. (using deferential analysis to examine Forest Service's decision).
10
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plan's requirement to protect biodiversity.8 ' The Seventh Circuit
found that the Forest Service's decision was not arbitrary and capri-
cious, and accepted the Forest Service's assertion that the principle
the plaintiffs advocated was uncertain as it applied to these facts
without a probe into the merits of that principle.8 2
b. Kettle Range Conservation Group v. United States Forest
Service8 3
In Kettle Range, the Kettle Range Conservation Group chal-
lenged the Forest Service's approval of a timber harvest and restora-
tion project.8 4 Plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service's analysis
was flawed because the Forest Service's method of analysis of dis-
turbed soil conditions was inadequate.8 5 The District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington focused its inquiry on the Forest Ser-
vice's procedure, but did not defer to the Forest Service's conclu-
sion.86 The District Court stated that the Forest Service was entitled
to judicial deference because the claim was based on the Forest Ser-
vice's expertise. 87 Nevertheless, the District Court concluded that
the Forest Service's analysis was improper, and therefore issued an
injunction to stop the timber harvest and restoration project until
the Forest Service conducted the proper analysis. 88 Thus, in Kettle
Range, the District Court did not defer to the Forest Service's choice
of methodology. 89
81. See id. at 609 (alleging Forest Service did not apply conservation biology
principles in LRM plan). In support of their claim, plaintiffs presented evidence
consisting of more than one hundred scientific articles, thirteen affidavits and ami-
cus briefs from scientific institutions. Id. at 618.
82. See id. at 621-24 (stating Seventh Circuit's analysis and holding).
83. 148 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
84. See id. (explaining project known as Douglas-fir Bark Beetle Project was
adopted by Colville National Forest (CNF) and Idaho Panhandle National Forest,
but that plaintiffs only challenged its implementation in one district of CNF).
85. See id. at 1125-27 (explaining court's finding that soil analysis method was
inadequate). The Forest Service did not observe or test the soil conditions at each
site. Id. at 1125-26. Instead, the Forest Service created estimations based on aerial
photos and generalized data. See id. The District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington refused to accept the Forest Service's conclusion without sufficient
reasoning concerning the Forest Service's reasoning as to why it could not obtain
the necessary data. See id. at 1126-27.
86. See id. at 1127 (explaining District Court's analysis).
87. See id. at 1116 (acknowledging judicial deference owed to Forest Service).
88. See Kettle Range, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (stating holding of case).
89. See id. (rejecting Forest Service's methodology which yielded generalized
results in favor of methodology that would result in particularized results).
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2. Deference When Reviewing Agency Decisions
a. Highly Deferential
1. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States
Forest Service9"
In Inland Empire, the Inland Empire Public Lands Council chal-
lenged a proposed timber sale in the Kootenai National Forest, al-
leging in part that the Forest Service violated the NFMA because
the Forest Service conducted an inadequate analysis of a "sensitive"
species. 91 The plaintiffs claimed that the Forest Service analysis was
insufficient because it failed to examine three areas.92 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that the NFMA contained a substantive duty to
protect biodiversity, especially sensitive species. 93 Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the Forest Service's analysis was sufficient
because the Forest Service's analysis was entitled to deference. 94
2. Cronin v. United States Department of Agriculture95
In Cronin, the Seventh Circuit upheld the Forest Service's deci-
sion.96 In Cronin, the Forest Service authorized "group selection"
harvesting from the Shawnee National Forest for a timber sale.97
Frequent recreational visitors of the Shawnee National Forest
sought a preliminary injunction to stop the timber sale, alleging
that the Forest Service violated the NFMA because it did not comply
with the LRM plan. 98 The plaintiffs asserted that to use group se-
90. 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996).
91. See id. at 758-59 (alleging Forest Service's analysis was inadequate because
Forest Service did not include any estimate of species population or related infor-
mation and analysis). To fulfill the NFMA's substantive requirements, the Forest
Service must ensure viable populations especially for 'sensitive species.' See 36
C.F.R. pt. 219.19 (2004).
92. See Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 760 (stating plaintiffs' claims that Forest Ser-
vice erred because it did not examine population of each species, trends of each
species and whether species could travel between different patches of forest).
93. See id. at 759 (noting NFMA substantive requirement to maintain diversity
in plants and animals).
94. See id. at 759-61 (examining court's reasoning as to why Forest Service's
decision was not arbitrary and capricious).
95. 919 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1990).
96. See id. at 449 (holding in favor of Forest Service).
97. See id. at 44142 (explaining case's factual background). Group selection
is a method of harvesting which consists of cutting down small patches of trees. See
id.
98. See id. (stating requirements contained in LRM plan). The LRM plan au-
thorized logging by "even-aged management," including clear-cutting. See id.
Clear-cutting is the cutting down of all trees in a given area. Id. at 441. Clear-
cutting is termed "even-aged management" because when all the trees in a tract
are cut down at the same time, then the trees that grow to replace them will be the
12
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lection, the Forest Service must show that group selection would
serve visual quality objectives. 99 The Seventh Circuit interpreted
the LRM plan as permitting clear-cutting unless it would not
achieve the visual quality objectives, in which case the Forest Service
may authorize a less unsightly method, such as group selection.1 00
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Forest Service's decision based on
the court's interpretation of the LRM plan. 10 1
b. Non-Deferential Ninth Circuit Decisions
1. Earth Island Institute v. United States Forest
Service 102
In Earth Island, the Ninth Circuit reversed an earlier decision
denying plaintiffs a preliminary injunction prohibiting the imple-
mentation of a restoration project involving timber sales. 03 The
plaintiff, Earth Island Institute, challenged a restoration project in
the Eldorado Forest of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.10 4 The Ninth
Circuit found a likelihood of success on the merits of the claim that
the Forest Service's failure to conduct a specific survey violated the
applicable LRM plan. a0 5 The Ninth Circuit did not defer to the
Forest Service's reasoning for not conducting the survey.
10 6
same age. See id. The LRM plan also authorized "uneven-aged management," such
as group selection, when it was needed to attain certain objectives, including visual
quality. See id. at 441-42.
99. See id at 439 (stating case's holding that preliminary injunction to stop
timber harvest was denied).
100. See Cronin, 919 F.2d at 447 (stating court's interpretation of LRM plan).
101. See id. at 447-48 (stating court's holding that Forest Service's decision did
not violate forest plan).
102. 351 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 2003).
103. See id. at 1309 (stating Ninth Circuit's holding that District Court's denial
of preliminary injunction was reversed).
104. See id. at 1295 (explaining background of challenged project, Star Fire
Restoration Project).
105. See id. at 1304 (explaining Ninth Circuit's rationale for holding in favor
of plaintiffs). The Ninth Circuit noted that the LRM plan unambiguously required
a survey to confirm that a habitat is unoccupied, and in this case, that Forest Ser-
vice failed to conduct this survey. See id.
106. See id. at 1303 (stating Forest Service's reason for not conducting survey
to determine habitat's occupancy was unsuitable). The Forest Service ignored sci-
entific research that indicated that owls may return to previously abandoned
places. See id. (pointing out Forest Service's critical oversight).
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2. Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. United States Forest
Service10 7
In Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain, the plaintiff environmental
groups sought to enjoin a timber sale in the Payette National For-
est.'08 The plaintiffs claimed that the Forest Service violated the
NFMA because it approved the sale. 10 9 The LRM plan required
that any project retain a certain percentage of old growth habitat in
a specified area.110 The Forest Service did not show that the re-
quired percentage of old growth habitat would remain in the speci-
fied area after the sale."1 The Ninth Circuit interpreted the NFMA
narrowly and held that the Forest Service violated the NFMA be-
cause it inadequately evaluated whether the proposed timber sale
was consistent with the LRM plan." 2
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Lands Council, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Forest Ser-
vice's decision to proceed with a timber harvest as part of a water-
shed restoration project." 3 The Nonprofit groups argued that the
Forest Service violated the NEPA and the NFMA. 14 The Ninth Cir-
cuit began it analysis by reviewing the background of the Project
107. 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1998).
108. See id. at 1375 (stating requested relief).
109. See id. (stating Forest Service's alleged NFMA violation).
110. See id. at 1377 (noting requirement to comply with LRM plan). The For-
est Service had to show that after the timber sale, at least 5% of old growth or
mature forest within each theoretical pileated woodpecker home range would re-
main, and that 2.5% of this area would be old growth habitat. See id.
111. See id. (noting that Forest Service did not show requisite percentage of
old growth habitat would remain after project was implemented). Instead, the
Forest Service recited survey results showing that the requisite percentage would
remain in the whole sales area, but not in the woodpecker home ranges, as re-
quired. See id. at 1378.
112. See Susan Jane M. Brown. Striking the Balance: The Tale of Eight Ninth Cir-
cuit Timber Sales Cases, 29 ENTL. L. 639, 669 (1999) (citing Neighbors of Cuddy Moun-
tain, 137 F.3d at 1378) (commenting on Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Forest
Service violated NFMA because Forest Service did not properly conduct one aspect
of required analysis).
113. See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining
Project). The Project was the Modified Alternative Eight of the Iron Honey Pro-
ject. Id. This Project included logging 17.5 million board feet of lumber from
1,408 acres of the Idaho Panhandle National Forest. Id.
114. See id. at 743 (stating plaintiffs' allegation that Forest Service's EIS was
incomplete because Forest Service's cumulative effects analysis and choice of scien-
tific methodology was improper). See also id. at 750 (stating plaintiffs' allegation
that Project did not comply with Forest Plan in three ways).
14
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and the procedural history of the case.Y15 The Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the APA provided the standard of review because, in
this case, the court was reviewing a decision of a federal agency." 6
A. The NEPA Claims
The Ninth Circuit considered the Nonprofit groups' claims
that the Forest Service violated the NEPA.117 After examining the
NEPA and the evidence, the Ninth Circuit determined that three of
the six alleged NEPA violations were valid, and thus the Forest Ser-
vice did violate the NEPA. 118
B. The NFMA Claims
The Ninth Circuit examined the proposed NFMA violations." 9
To comply with the NFMA, the Project must have conformed to the
Forest Plan. 120 The Nonprofit groups asserted that the Project did
not conform with the Forest Plan in three areas: fishery protection,
soils impact, and old-growth species viability.121 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit held that the first two of these areas did not conform
115. See id. at 74142 (noting District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Forest Service because Forest Service complied with NEPA and NFMA so
Forest Service's decision to approve Project was not arbitrary and capricious). See
id. at 74243 (discussing Project's history and its approval).
116. See id. at 743 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)) (stating that when agency deci-
sions are reviewed under APA, court must reverse agency decision only if action is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law"). The
Ninth Circuit used de novo standard of review from the same position as the District
Court. See id. (citing Sierra Club v. Babbit, 65 F.3d 1502, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995)).
117. See id. (reiterating Nonprofit groups' allegation that Forest Service's EIS
was incomplete due to error in Forest Service's cumulative effect analysis and sci-
entific methodology).
118. See Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 744-50 (separating NEPA violations in two
categories: (1) that Final EIS lacked required "hard look" at cumulative effects in
areas of prior timber harvests, reasonably foreseeable future timber harvests, possi-
bility of toxic sediment transport, and impact on Westslope Cutthroat Trout; and
(2) that Forest Service's WATSED (water and sediment yields) model used was
incomplete, resulting in insufficient cumulative effects analysis of instream sedi-
mentation in Final EIS). The Forest Service did not take the required "hard look"
at timber harvests and evidence of current trout conditions. Id. at 750. The Ninth
Circuit also determined that there was an inadequate disclosure of the relevant
variables considered by the WATSED model. Id.
119. See id. at 744-50 (explaining Nonprofit groups' allegation that Forest Ser-
vice did not comply with NFMA).
120. See id. (setting forth applicable NFMA requirements).
121. See id. at 750 (reiterating Nonprofit groups' NFMA claims).
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with the Forest Plan, and that the third area only conformed in
part. 122
1. Fishery Protection
The Ninth Circuit had to first examine whether the INFISH
standards conflicted with the eighty percent fry emergence stan-
dard in the Forest Plan. 123 If the court found that the standards
conflicted, the Ninth Circuit would then have to consider whether
the INFISH standard provided more or the same amount of
protection. 124
The Ninth Circuit determined that the Forest Plan and the IN-
FISH guidelines did not conflict because both standards could be
met in all cases. 125 The Ninth Circuit used preventative terms to
refer to the INFISH standard, noting that certain circumstances al-
ways require it, and the court referred to the fry emergence stan-
dard in terms of mandating assessment and repair if necessary.1 26
Even though both standards measured stream sediment, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the standards were different because both "mea-
sure different variables, are triggered by different conditions, and
have different remedies."'127 The Ninth Circuit did not defer to the
Forest Service's conclusion because there was no ambiguity in the
scope or effect of either standard. 128 The Ninth Circuit held that,
because the standards did not conflict, the Forest Service erred in
using the INFISH standard in place of the Forest Plan's prescribed
fry emergence standard.1 29
122. See id. at 755 (stating Ninth Circuit's holding). Regarding the Project's
impact on old growth species viability, the Ninth Circuit found one of the two
alleged violations to be valid. Id. at 753-54
123. See Lands Council 379 F.3d at 751 (stating Ninth Circuit's analysis to de-
termine validity of plaintiffs' allegation).
124. See id. (stating Ninth Circuit's analysis to determine validity of plaintiffs'
allegation). "If the fry emergence standard is not implicitly superseded by INFISH,
then the Forest Service's decision must be set aside because the fry emergence
standard was never evaluated." See id.
125. See id. (stating Ninth Circuit's conclusion that standards were not in
conflict).
126. See id. (discussing rationale for determining that there was no conflict
between INFISH standard and Forest Plan's fry emergence standard).
127. See id. (discussing rationale for finding no conflict between standards).
128. See Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 751 (stating Forest Service's reasons for
using INFISH standard and failing to use fry emergence standard).
129. See id. (explaining why Forest Service erred in determining that INFISH
standard replaced Forest Plan's fry emergence standard).
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2. Soils Impact
The Forest Plan provided that the Forest Service could not ap-
prove any activity that would create detrimental soil conditions in
fifteen percent of the proposed project area.1 30 The Ninth Circuit
relied on Kettle Range to determine that the methodology was insuf-
ficient.1 31 In Kettle Range, the District Court for the Eastern District
of Washington found no merit in estimates or projections based on
generalized data and aerial photographs, absent any on-site verifica-
tion or inspection.'3 2 The Ninth Circuit adopted this rationale and
stated that the Forest Service's estimates were unreliable without
verification by observation, and therefore, the Forest Service vio-
lated the NFMA.1 33
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Lands Council, the Ninth Circuit was reluctant to yield to the
requirement that the Forest Service ensure the Project conformed
to the Forest Plan.13 4 Although the Ninth Circuit established that
the Forest Service is owed deference because of its expertise, espe-
cially on issues of scientific methodology, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that such deference did not allow the Forest Service to make
these substitutions in the methodology. 3 5 The Ninth Circuit's re-
luctance to yield was made more apparent when considering that
the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Forest Service's decisions under the
arbitrary and capricious standard. 136 The Ninth Circuit's decision
in Lands Council was internally consistent, consistent with Congres-
130. See id. at 752 (noting Forest Plan's standard for soil conditions).
131. See id. (citing Kettle Range Conservation Group v. United States Forest Serv.,
148 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1127 (E.D.Wash. 2001)) (equating Forest Service's current
methodology to the methodology that United States District Court for Eastern Dis-
trict of Washington rejected in Kettle Range).
132. See id. (citing Kettle Range, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1127) (demanding testing
of actual area for valid analysis).
133. See Lands Council 379 F.3d at 752 (stating that facts of this case are same
as in Kettle Range). The Ninth Circuit noted that the Forest Service's predictions
based on the spreadsheet model were not verified with any ground analysis. See id.
134. See id. at 751-55 (describing Ninth Circuit's strict analysis).
135. See Inland Empire Pub. Lands v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 760
(9th Cir. 1996) (explaining deference courts owe to agency expertise).
136. See Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 743 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (noting when arbitrary and capri-
cious standard is met). The arbitrary and capricious standard is met "if the agency
fails to consider an important aspect of a problem, if the agency offers an explana-
tion for the problem that is contrary to the evidence, if the agency's decision is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or be the product
of agency expertise." Id. (citations omitted). This standard is also met if the agency's
decision is contrary to the governing law. See id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)).
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sional intent, consistent with precedent, properly distinguishable
from contrary precedent and proper in light of the NFMA and the
APA.137
A. Internally Consistent
The Ninth Circuit in Lands Council used a 'probing review' to
examine the allegations of the Forest Service's noncompliance with
the NEPA, as well as the NFMA. 138 The Ninth Circuit found three
violations of the NEPA.' 3 9 When examining the NEPA claims, the
Ninth Circuit required strict compliance with the NEPA and did
not give much deference to the Forest Service's methodology.1 40
The Ninth Circuit's holding concerning the NEPA issues demon-
strated the Ninth Circuit's consistent disinclination to allow the For-
est Service deference in interpreting unambiguous statutory re-
quirements. 14
B. Consistent with Congressional Intent
One purpose of the NFMA was to limit the Forest Service's dis-
cretion and deference in managing the nation's forests. 142 To ac-
complish this purpose, Congress required an interdisciplinary
scientific approach by directing the Secretary of Agriculture to as-
semble a committee of scientists from outside the Forest Service to
create regulations to further the NFMA's substantive require-
ments. 143 Although recognizing the need to give some deference
to the Forest Service, Congress' inclusion of both procedural re-
quirements created by those with the requisite scientific knowledge
and substantive limitations shows its desire to limit discretion. 144
137. For a discussion of the factors supporting the propriety of the decision in
Lands Council, see infra notes 138-96.
138. See Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 743-50 (stating court's analysis regarding
NEPA claims).
139. See id. at 743 (stating court's holding).
140. See id. at 743-50 (setting forth court's analysis of alleged NEPA viola-
tions).
141. See id. at 743-53 (showing amount of deference Ninth Circuit gave Forest
Service).
142. See Potter, supra note 5, at 247 (explaining proper judicial review of For-
est Service decisions under NFMA).
143. See Madden, supra note 53, at 330 (stating Congress' intent to limit For-
est Service's discretion). Another indication of this intent is the requirement that
committee members be from outside the Forest Service. Id.
144. See id. (stating statutory elements meant to limit Forest Service's dis-
cretion).
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Congress' actions also gave the courts more law to apply, so the
courts now have a greater ability to "keep the Service in check."' 45
Congress also intended that the LRM plans change with the
evolving science by requiring that they be revised "from time to
time when the Secretary finds conditions in a unit have significantly
changed, but at least every fifteen years."' 46 This requirement pro-
vides a mechanism for the regulations in LRM plans to change with
scientific advances. 147 In Lands Council, the Ninth Circuit's insis-
tence that the Forest Service comply with the Forest Plan's unam-
biguous requirements does not defeat Congress' intent. 148 If, in its
expertise, the Forest Service found fault with methods in the Forest
Plan, the Forest Service could have revised the Forest Plan rather
than disregarding clear requirements. 149
1. Rubber-stamping v. Probing Review
There are two extremes when a court reviews a NFMA deci-
sion: (1) "unquestioning deference, or rubber-stamping," and (2)
"a probing review requiring adequate explanations for deci-
sions. ' 150 In Lands Council, the Ninth Circuit used the probing re-
view approach, which is more consistent with congressional intent
than the unquestioning deference approach.1 5 1 The propriety of
the Ninth Circuit's review in Lands Council conducting a "probing
review" is apparent by reviewing Sierra Club, a case where the court
gave "unquestioning deference."' 52 The Seventh Circuit affirmed
the Forest Service's decision, even though the Forest Service did
not provide an acceptable explanation for this decision in the face
145. See Potter, supra note 5, at 247 (summarizing Congress' steps to limit
Forest Service's discretion).
146. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f) (5) (stating NFMA requirement that LRM plans
must be periodically revised).
147. See id. (stating NFMA revision requirement).
148. See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 749-53 (9th Cir. 2004) (discuss-
ing Ninth Circuit's rationale for determining that Forest Service was not entitled to
deference under NFMA).
149. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f) (5) (stating NFMA's option to revise LRM plan
"from time to time when the Secretary finds conditions in a unit have significantly
changed").
150. See Potter, supra note 5, at 252 (noting tension between two positions on
judicial review of Forest Service decisions under NFMA). The two positions on
judicial review of agency decisions are: (1) total deference; and (2) an inquisitive
review, in which the court will not defer to the Forest Service without sufficient
explanation. See id.
151. See id. (giving examples of NFMA cases utilizing deferential review).
152. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
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of the vast amount of evidence that plaintiffs presented. 153 In Sierra
Club, the court acted contrary to congressional intent that a LRM
plan should contain contemporary scientific knowledge because
the court was too deferential and did not require the Forest Service
to provide an acceptable explanation for its decision in the face of
an overwhelming amount of contrary evidence. 154 Congress' inclu-
sion in the NFMA of the requirement that forest plans be periodi-
cally revised is evidence of this intent.155
C. Consistent with Precedent
The decision in Lands Council meets the test articulated in
Chevron.156 In Chevron, the Court imposed a two-step analysis to de-
termine the proper amount of judicial deference a court should
give to agency decisions.1 57 First, a court must determine if Con-
gress was silent or ambiguous on the matter. 158 If so, then the
agency's determination ought to be upheld if it is reasonable; if
not, "the court must give effect to the unambiguously expressed in-
tent of Congress."1 59 The Lands Council holding was proper under
the Chevron analysis.' 60 Ambiguity in a statute or in a forest plan
can be read as a grant of reasonable authority to the agency. 161 In
the NFMA, Congress unambiguously required that the LRM plans
reflect the NFMA's substantive requirements, and that once a LRM
plan is established, a proposed project must conform to the existing
153. See id. at 621 (stating Forest Service considered conservation biology but
it deemed conservation biology uncertain as applied to these forests). Plaintiffs
responded by noting that there is always some uncertainty in science and that sci-
ence could not be tested at every location. See id.
154. See Madden, supra note 53, at 329 (noting Congress' motive behind revi-
sion requirement). In Sierra Club, the plaintiffs attacked the LRM plan's methodol-
ogy to preserve biodiversity and supported their claims with a vast amount of data
and testimonials confirming that their alternative was more appropriate in light of
conservation biology. See Sierra Club, 46 F.3d at 609-17.
155. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f) (5) (stating revision requirement concerning
LRM plans).
156. See Shuren, supra note 52, at 291 (citations omitted) (noting that in Chev-
ron, Court advocated deferential standard).
157. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counci Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 (1984) (setting forth Court's method of analysis).
158. See Shuren, supra note 52, at 291 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44)
(stating first step of Chevron analysis).
159. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (stating second step of Chevron analysis).
160. See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 751-53 (9th Cir. 2004) (explain-
ing Ninth Circuit's holding on issue of whether Forest Service violated NFMA).
161. See Shuren, supra note 52, at 326 (noting one possible interpretation of
Chevron analysis).
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LRM plans. 162 In Lands Council, the Ninth Circuit, consistent with
congressional intent, required the Forest Service to follow the un-
ambiguous requirements of the NFMA and the Forest Plan.163
1. Consistent with Ninth Circuit Decisions
In previous cases, the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to allow def-
erence to the Forest Service to be a barrier to requiring strict com-
pliance.' 64 In Earth Island, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
Forest violated the NFMA because it refused to conduct a survey
required by the LRM plan. 165 Lands Council was consistent with this
holding because the Ninth Circuit did not defer to the Forest Ser-
vice. In both cases, the Ninth Circuit held that failure to follow the
requirements of the LRM plan violated the NFMA. 166
The decision in Lands Council is also consistent with Neighbors of
Cuddy Mountain. In Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Forest Service violated the NFMA because the Forest
Service inadequately evaluated whether the proposed timber sale
was consistent with the LRM plan. 167 The Forest Service attempted
to substitute generalized findings for the more detailed ones re-
quired by the plan, but the court was unwilling to accept that.168
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Forest Service's method-
ology was owed deference, but that was not at issue because the
Forest Service previously created a method in the LRM plan and
162. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (stating NFMA's unambiguous requirements con-
cerning LRM plans).
163. See Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 751-52 (setting forth Forest Plan's require-
ments).
164. For further discussion of cases where the Ninth Circuit did not give ex-
ceeding deference to the Forest Service and subsequently determined that the For-
est Service violated NFMA, see infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
165. See Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1304 (9th
Cir. 2003) (stating court's holding regarding this issue). The LRM plan's unam-
biguous language required survey to confirm habitat was unoccupied, yet the For-
est Service failed to conduct one. Id. The Forest Service did not conduct the
required survey with regard to owls because the Forest Service determined that this
habitat was unsuitable for owls. Id. at 1303. The Forest Service ignored scientific
research that indicated owls may return to previously abandoned places. Id.
166. For further explanation of Earth Island, see supra notes 102-06 and ac-
companying text.
167. See Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. United States Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372,
1377 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that Forest Service failed to make required showing).
The Forest Service failed to show that after the timber sale, at least 5 percent of old
growth or mature forest within each theoretical pileated woodpecker home range
would remain, and that 2.5 percent of this remaining area would be old growth
habitat. Id.
168. See id. at 1378 (explaining Forest Service determined that after sale there
would be requisite amount of old growth area in whole sale area, but lacked proof
of whether requisite amount of old growth area would remain in specified areas).
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now the Forest Service refused to comply with the LRM plan. 169 In
Lands Council, the Ninth Circuit required the Forest Service to ful-
fill the unambiguous requirements in the Forest Plan, so the court
merely applied the Forest Service's own method to the facts. 170
Lands Council is also consistent with the decision in Kettle
Range.1 71 In Kettle Range, the Ninth Circuit held that the Forest Ser-
vice's soil analysis was inadequate. 172 In Kettle Range, the Forest Ser-
vice relied on estimates based on assumptions from general data,
maps and aerial photographs, rather than tests conducted on the
land. 73 The Ninth Circuit stated that, "absent a justification re-
garding why more definitive information could not be provided,"
the court was not obligated to yield to the Forest Service's method-
ology.174 In Lands Council, the Forest Service used the same meth-
odology for soil analysis, in the same National Forest that was
deemed inadequate in Kettle Range.175
D. Properly Distinguishable from Contrary Precedent
Lands Council does not conflict with those decisions where the
Forest Service prevailed because of deference given to its deci-
sions.' 76 In Inland Empire, despite recognizing that the NFMA con-
tains a substantive duty to protect biodiversity, especially when a
sensitive species is involved, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Forest
Service's analysis was entitled to deference and thus was suffi-
169. See id. at 1376 (stating deference Ninth Circuit gave to Forest Service's
scientific methodology). Here, the court's analysis did not infringe on the proper
amount of deference owed the Forest Service because the court "simply applied
[the Forest Service's] own method of calculating old growth to the facts," and the
LRM plan requirements were not met. See Brown, supra note 112, at 669.
170. See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 750-55 (9th Cir. 2004) (showing
Ninth Circuit's application of facts to Forest Plan's requirements when analyzing
whether Forest Service violated NFMA).
171. See Kettle Range Conservation Group v. United States Forest Serv., 148 F. Supp.
2d 1107 (stating court's analysis and holding).
172. See id. at 1127 (stating due to Forest Service's methodology, soil analysis
is inadequate).
173. See id. (stating methodology Forest Service used).
174. See id. (citing Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. United States Forest Serv.,
88 F.3d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1996)) (asserting that generalized statements without
adequate justification were insufficient to meet NEPA's "hard look" requirement).
175. See Lands Council, 379 F.3d at 752 (explaining method Forest Service
used in soil analysis). The Forest Service also created a spreadsheet model based
on samples taken throughout the forest and aerial pictures, and based on this
spreadsheet model, the Forest Service estimated the Project area's soil quality. See
id.
176. For further discussion of two cases where the Ninth Circuit gave the For-
est Service more deference than in Lands Council, see infra notes 177-85 and ac-
companying text.
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cient.'7 7 In Inland Empire, however, the Ninth Circuit faced a more
ambiguous question than the court in Lands Council because the
question in Inland Empire went further than merely applying the
LRM plan's requirements.1 7 8 In Inland Empire, the issue concerned
the Forest Service's interpretation of a more ambiguous require-
ment, so the court should have given the Forest Service more defer-
ence in resolving this issue than in Lands Council.
179
In Cronin, the Seventh Circuit deferred to the Forest Service's
decision.18 0 The LRM plan provided for the use of group selection
when needed to obtain objectives, such as visual quality. 18 1 Both
the plaintiffs and the Forest Service interpreted this requirement
differently. 18 2 The court gave deference to the Forest Service's in-
terpretation and determined that the Forest Service's interpreta-
tion was not contrary to the NFMA.1 83 The court reasoned that the
existence of two differing but reasonable interpretations of the
LRM plan showed that it was ambiguous, and thus was an appropri-
ate situation to grant the Forest Service deference.1 8 4 Conversely,
in Lands Council, the Ninth Circuit properly withheld deference to
the Forest Service's interpretation because the Forest Plan's re-
quirements were not ambiguous.18 5
177. See Inland Empire Pub. Land v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 759-61
(9th Cir. 1996) (explaining court's reasoning that Forest Service's decision was not
arbitrary and capricious).
178. See id. at 759 (stating issue in Inland Empire). In Inland Empire, the issue
was "what type of population viability analysis [must] the [Forest Service] perform
in order to comply with Regulation 219.19." Id. Regulation 219.19 ensures popu-
lation viability, especially for sensitive species and is a regulation that the Forest
Service must follow to fulfill NFMA's substantive requirements. See 36 C.F.R. pt.
219.19 (2004).
179. See Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 759-61 (explaining court's reasoning that
Forest Service's decision was not arbitrary and capricious).
180. See Cronin v. United States Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 1990)
(stating background of case).
181. See id. (stating LRM plan's requirements).
182. See id. at 441-42 (stating LRM plan's requirements). The LRM plan au-
thorized logging by "even-aged management," specifically by clear-cutting, and
"uneven-aged management," such as group selection, when it was needed to attain
various objectives. See id.
183. See id. at 449 (holding that decision of forest supervisor was not "arbitrary
or otherwise in error").
184. See id. at 441-42 (setting forth two different reasonable interpretations).
185. See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 751-53 (9th Cir. 2004) (explain-
ing Ninth Circuit's analysis and Forest Plan's unambiguous requirements).
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E. Proper in Light of the NFMA and the APA
The Ninth Circuit's probing review approach is also consistent
with the NFMA and the APA.18 6 In the NFMA, Congress provided a
monitoring requirement to ensure favorable results, which requires
that the Secretary must revise LRM plans when "conditions in a unit
have significantly changed, but at least every fifteen years."1 87 How-
ever, neither statute includes any type of monitoring requirement
to determine whether a Forest Service decision that differs from a
LRM plan, yet is judicially approved due to deference to the Forest
Service, yields favorable results. 188 Moreover, both the NFMA and
the APA lack provisions providing for retroactive action to remedy
any problems that such monitoring would uncover. 189 Thus, there
is no safeguard to ensure that deferential decisions are ultimately in
the best interest of the national forests. 190 The "proper application
of the arbitrary and capricious standard ... gives substantial defer-
ence to the agency while ensuring that the agency's conclusions are
supported by a reasonable assessment of the facts."' 9 ' This man-
date to consider reasonableness is especially important given the
absence of such monitoring requirements as described above. 192
When courts give deference to the Forest Service's scientific
expertise, it is usually in regard to scientific methodology and fac-
tual determinations. 193 When exercising this discretion, the courts
usually do not conduct an extensive inquiry into whether the Forest
Service has complied with the NFMA's substantive regulations. 194
186. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (stating NFMA's requirements). See also 5 U.S.C.
§ 701-706 (2000) (stating APA's requirements concerning judicial review of agency
decisions).
187. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (stating NFMA's revision requirement).
188. See id. (showing NFMA requirements lack this type of monitoring re-
quirement); 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (showing APA also lacks this type of moni-
toring requirement).
189. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (showing NFMA requirements lack provision for ret-
roactive action); 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (showing APA also lacks provision for
retroactive action).
190. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (showing NFMA requirements lack safeguard); 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (showing APA also lacks safeguard).
191. See Brown, supra note 112, at 681 (describing proper application of arbi-
trary and capricious standard).
192. See id. (noting that courts must ensure agency reasonably assessed facts
in making decision).
193. See Inland Empire Pub. Lands v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 760
(9th Cir. 1996) (noting standard of review for agency decisions under APA). See
also Potter, supra note 5, at 252 (noting great amount of deference courts give to
agency decisions regarding scientific methodology and factual determinations).
194. See Potter, supra note 5, at 252 (noting generalized method courts use to
review agency decisions).
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Often, however, the purpose of requiring certain methodology in a
LRM plan is to further a NFMA substantive requirement.1 95 There-
fore, courts should require compliance with requirements in LRM
plans which the Forest Service itself creates, because it is a way for
courts to enforce NFMA's substantive requirements. 196
VI. IMPACT
The impact of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lands Council is
that it strengthens the likelihood that the NFMA's substantive re-
quirements will be enforced.1 9 7 In reversing the District Court, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the high level of deference the District Court
gave the Forest Service. 198
A court should not give extreme deference to the Forest Ser-
vice's interpretation of an unambiguous requirement because that
would allow the Forest Service to ignore reputable scientific knowl-
edge, which Congress has required to be reflected in the LRM plan,
without sufficient justification. 199 This would defeat Congress' in-
tention that the "nation's forests .. be managed according to ad-
vancing scientific knowledge. '20 0 Judicial deference should not
insulate an agency from considering scientific advances. 201 The
Lands Council decision will force the Forest Service to update LRM
plans based on the current scientific advances and to better enforce
NFMA substantive requirements. 20 2
Unless Congress adds a monitoring requirement to the NFMA
or the APA, the most effective way to ensure the NFMA's substan-
tive requirements are met is for the courts to conduct probing re-
195. See id. at 246-47 (noting that NFMA is drastic change from traditional
approach of almost complete deference to Forest Service decisions).
196. See id. (stating function of NFMA's procedural requirements).
197. For a discussion of the basis for this conclusion, see supra notes 193-96
and accompanying text.
198. See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 755 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing
Ninth Circuit's holding).
199. See Inland Empire Pub. Lands v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 763
(9th Cir. 1996) (illustrating instance where Ninth Circuit deferred to Forest Ser-
vice's decision, even though decision was contrary to Forest Service's duty to pro-
tect biodiversity).
200. See Madden, supra note 53, at 333 (noting that NFMA was intended to
utilize modern scientific principles and methods).
201. See Potter, supra note 5, at 252-53 (citations omitted) (commenting on ef-
fect of holding in Sierra Club). In Sierra Club, the court accepted the Forest Ser-
vice's weak justification for its decision and rejected the vast amount of evidence
supporting the principle the Forest Service chose not to use in creating the LRM
plan. See id. (citations omitted).
202. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f-g) (setting forth substantive provisions to be fur-
thered by methodology in LRM plans, and revision requirement).
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views.20 3 If Congress was to create a monitoring requirement in
either of these statutes, it should entail: (1) creating a committee
to monitor challenged Forest Service decisions that were judicially
approved based on extreme judicial deference to ensure that the
NFMA's substantive requirements are met; and (2) requiring the
Forest Service to take remedial action if the committee determines
that the NFMA's substantive requirements are not met.20 4 Absent
such a provision, the most effective way to ensure fulfillment of the
NFMA's substantive requirements is for the courts to conduct a
probing review.20 5
Even though they are not scientific experts, judges can still
conduct the review necessary to adequately safeguard NFMA pur-
poses.206 Judges can require that the Forest Service fully comply
with the express requirements of both the NFMA and the applica-
ble LRM plan.20 7 If the Forest Service deviates from these require-
ments, judges can require the Forest Service to adequately explain
this departure. 208 Courts need only ensure that agency decisions
are within the bounds of statutory authority. 20 9
If other jurisdictions follow the Ninth Circuit's approach, the
Forest Service would be more accountable for their decisions and
would conduct a more thorough analysis before making a decision
to ensure that their decision complied with the NFMA, lest the
courts reverse their decision. Due to both the Forest Service con-
ducting more careful analysis and the courts reversing agency deci-
sions that do not strictly comply without sufficient justification, the
203. See id. § 1604 (showing absence of this type of monitoring requirement);
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (showing absence of this type of monitoring
requirement).
204. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. The court should not defer
to the Forest Service without adequate justification. See Brown, supra note 112, at
681 (describing that judicial deference to Forest Service should be supported by
"reasonable assessment of the facts").
206. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2) (stating that administrative agencies are given
discretion); see also id. § 706(2) (A) (explaining when an agency decision should be
overturned). An agency's decision should be overturned if it is "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." Id.
207. See Potter, supra note 5, at 262 (noting how judicial review will best serve
national forests).
208. See id. (noting action judge should take if Forest Service deviates from
LRM plan). A court should ensure that "the Forest Service has justified its substan-
tive actions to the court in a logical, coherent, and succinct fashion rather than
simply rolling over when science is involved." Id. at 261.
209. See id. at 248-49 (stating courts must review agency decisions in manner
that does not violate separation of powers).
26
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol16/iss2/3
2005] RUBBER-STAMPING V. PROBING REVIEW 235
ultimate result of jurisdictions following the Ninth Circuit in Lands
Council would be a benefit to our national forests.210
Jamie Kester
210. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (noting circumstances
which lead to conclusion requiring strict compliance with NFMA procedures
would best serve purposes of NFMA).
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